F-35 It seems the lobbyists, bots et al are busy at the moment 1/Let’s debunk the myth that the US has a “kill switch” for the F-35. You’ve probably heard it: the US can remotely disable these jets if an ally steps out of line. Cool story, but it’s not true. Here’s how it actually works—and where the real control lies.

The Flower-Class Corvette: A Study in Simplicity, Strength, and Evolution 1/25 Introduction to the Flower-Class Corvette Flower-class corvette, a modest warship of World War II, epitomised utility over grandeur. Built by the Royal Navy and its allies, it served as a small but vital escort vessel. This thread (as requested) examines its design, strengths, weaknesses, wartime role, and legacy as a test bed for future naval platforms.

Introduction to E-7 Wedgetail Challenges 1/25 The UK E-7 Wedgetail programme, replacing the RAF’s E-3D Sentry, delivers advanced airborne early warning & control (AEW&C). It faces significant hurdles, from delays to budget cuts. This thread explores these challenges & who’s responsible for them.

Thread: HMS Ark Royal - A Study in Naval Innovation and Lost Potential 1/25: HMS Ark Royal, the Royal Navy’s last steam catapult carrier, commissioned in 1955, epitomised British naval engineering. This thread examines her history, design, air wing evolution, and legacy, culminating in a critique of her premature 1979 decommissioning.

UK’s F-35B Ambitions (updated) 1/25 The UK’s adoption of the F-35B Lightning II aims to deliver cutting-edge, fifth-generation capabilities for the RAF and RN. However, integrating this platform faces challenges in weapon systems, logistics, operational concepts, and sovereignty, raising questions about value for money and strategic fit.

The Type 45 Destroyer Fleet – Limitations and Strategic Challenges 1/ The Type 45 destroyer, the Royal Navy’s premier air defence platform, replaced the 12-ship Type 42 fleet with just 6 hulls between 2009-2013. Advanced but constrained, it struggles to meet tasking demands. A thread on its limits, availability, and fleet size issues.

HMS Fearless: The Deathstar - A Legacy 1/25 Introduction to HMS Fearless HMS Fearless (L10), a Fearless-class landing platform dock (LPD), commissioned in 1965, was the cornerstone of Royal Navy amphibious warfare. Nicknamed “The Deathstar” by crews and embarked forces, it embodied innovation and adaptability. This thread series explores its design, operational history, and legacy.

Wonder why….

Doesn’t look to bothered in this photo 🤷🏻‍♂️

The Leander-Class Frigate: A Study in Naval Design, Adaptability, and Legacy 1/25 The Leander-class frigate exemplifies British naval ingenuity. Conceived post-WWII, it fused wartime experience with Cold War demands. This thread examines its design, adaptability, and legacy as a versatile warship serving into the 21st century.

The UK’s F-35A and F-35B Procurement: Strategic Shifts and Challenges 1/25 The UK’s recent decision to purchase 12 F-35A jets alongside its F-35B fleet marks a significant shift in defence policy. This thread explores the rationale, sacrifices, and challenges, focusing on the nuclear role, NATO, and impacts on Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP). It follows my F-35B post from yesterday - talk about “timing” 😎

UK MoD - F-35, from B to A or just to B? 1/15 Rumour’s hint the UK might buy F-35As, not just F-35Bs for RN carriers. Ex-RAF pilots, backed by Lockheed Martin, lobby for this shift. But is it plausible? The UK’s carrier strike hinges on F-35B. Let’s take a dangerous and contentious journey.

Introduction to the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor Following the recent Red Sea “interception” of a P-8 and my thread on the system (the airframe is just the platform that gets the sensor where it needs to be) I thought it would be useful to describe what the “sensor” was clipped to the fuselage. As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @Raytheon_UK 1/25 The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS) is a state-of-the-art multifunction radar developed by Raytheon (now RTX Corporation) for the United States Navy’s P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), the AAS represents a significant advancement in airborne radar technology. This thread attempts to follow its development from conceptualisation to operational deployment, elucidates its functionality, and examines its integration with the P-8A. Furthermore, it explores opportunities for the United Kingdom and NATO allies—Canada, Norway, and Germany—to enhance their P-8 fleets, addressing capability gaps such as those left by the we retired Sentinel R1 and soon the Shadow R1, and concludes by highlighting its role as a force multiplier.

The Royal Marines: Origins, Evolution, and the Enduring Commando Tests (maintaining the standard) 1/25 This thread examines the Royal Marines’ training, its historical inception, and the rationale for the Commando Tests. It traces their evolution since 1945, the conferment of Commando status, and the unchanging standards that define their status.

UK Carrier Strike - A discussion 1/25 The UK’s Carrier Strike capability, embodied by the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and F-35B, marks a significant evolution in naval power projection. This thread examines its advantages, limitations, and potential enhancements, inviting debate on its strategic efficacy.

The County-Class Destroyer – The Royal Navy’s First Digital Warship 1/25 The County-class destroyer, launched in the 1960s, was a groundbreaking step for the Royal Navy, blending missile technology and automation. This thread explores its design, innovations, and legacy, from conception to its role in conflicts and eventual decline. Opinions my own, facts can be questioned.

Introduction to the Type 31 Frigate 1/25: The Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate, or Inspiration-class, is a cost-effective solution to replace aging the Type 23s. This thread examines its concept, procurement, roles, design, systems, challenges, & future, arguing success requires more ships & exports. Checkout @NavyLookout for an in depth look.

11/ Wrap-up: the “kill switch” is a myth, hyped up by the F-35’s networked vibe and US dominance. ALIS and ODIN are about maintenance, not mastery. But logistics? That’s where the US holds the reins, ensuring only a fully serviceable jet takes off. No conspiracies needed.

Introduction to Artisan and NS110/200 Comparison Follow Up Part 1 on my T31 Thread 1/25: The Artisan Radar (BAE Systems) and Thales NS110/200 radars are key to Royal Navy’s T26 and T31 frigates. This thread compares their hardware, software, strengths, weaknesses, C2 integration, and RN challenges in supporting dual radar systems from different suppliers in complex maritime environments.

Type 23 - Towed Array Patrol Ship (TAPS) 1/25 The Towed Array Patrol Ship (TAPS) is an unsung hero of the Royal Navy. This thread explores its role, ecosystem, and why the Type 23 fleet is stretched. I’ll cover Sonar 2087, Merlin helicopters, and the strategic stakes—starting with the CASD’s silent shield.

The Tiger-Class Cruiser: A Thread on the Royal Navy’s Last Big Gun Ships 1/25 The Tiger-class cruisers; HMS Tiger, Lion, and Blake, mark a pivotal era in Royal Navy (RN) history, bridging the age of gun-based warships and the missile-dominated fleets of the Cold War.

The Boeing P-8 Poseidon: An Essential Pillar of Contemporary Maritime Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare 1/25 In this quickly put together long thread, I shall attempt examine the Boeing P-8 Poseidon. The thread will attempt traverse its developmental trajectory from initial requirements to full operational service, with a particular emphasis on its integration and utilisation within the Royal Air Force (RAF). Given the resurgence of underwater threats in the North Atlantic, the RAF’s (and others) recent and ongoing deployment of the P-8 underscores its strategic relevance. This thread is tailored for a predominantly British audience, highlighting RAF-specific applications, whilst attempting to remain relevant for other readers. It will follow my standard format and address the aircraft’s concept of operations, its synergies with complementary assets, the geopolitical significance of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, specifically including recent multinational activities—and detailed analyses of its sensors, armaments, configurations, and comparisons to predecessors and contemporaries. It will explore the RAF’s infrastructure adaptations, procurement decisions, and the platform’s pivotal role in supporting the United Kingdom’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD). As always, all views my own and facts can be challenged. This has been written (at pace) to give some context to the recent events other contributors (@TBrit90 @NavyLookout @pegge49 @auonsson) For additional context I have worked on the RAF P-8 (not as an aviator) Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4 (the world’s best ASW long range fixed wing aircraft). Apologies for grammar and any repetition. The Boeing P-8 Poseidon demonstrates an uplift in maritime patrol capabilities, evolving from the United States Navy’s (USN) need to modernise its fleet in the face of evolving submarine technologies. For the RAF, the P-8 has restored a critical capability absent since the retirement of the Nimrod fleet, enabling robust surveillance over vast oceanic expanses. Its adoption by NATO allies, including the UK , reflects a collective commitment to countering asymmetric threats posed by advanced submarines from potential adversaries (specially Russian). In recent months, the RAF has markedly heightened its operational tempo with the P-8, deploying aircraft for extended missions in contested waters, thereby reinforcing the UK’s maritime security posture and contributing to alliance-wide deterrence efforts but also (in the RAf’s case) if nine aircraft was enough.

Introduction to UK GBAD Status 1/25 The UK’s ground-based air defence (GBAD) relies on the Sky Sabre system, operated by 16 Regt RA. However, limited deployability and 2005/6 cuts have weakened the UK’s ability to protect bases like RAF Akrotiri from Iran’s long-range missiles, exposing strategic vulnerabilities in a tense global environment.

8/ Here’s the real kicker: the US doesn’t need a kill switch. They control logistics. The F-35’s a beast - stealth, sensors, engines and all need to be serviceable to fly safely. Guess who runs the global supply chain for those parts? Lockheed Martin and the US gov.

10/ It’s not dramatic, no mid-air shutdowns. It’s slow and boring: deny parts, let wear-and-tear do the rest. Foreign operators can’t just duct-tape an F-35 like an old MiG. The high-tech guts demand US-sourced fixes. That’s the real control.

5/ So why the myth? It’s the US connection. ALIS and ODIN tie into servers the US oversees. Some figure: “What if they cut access?” Sure, that’d mess up maintenance, big time. But the jet could still fly. It’s not a remote “off” button; it’s a slow logistics headache.

6/ Another angle: software updates. The F-35’s got 8M+ lines of code, and the US pushes updates for security and performance. Could they withhold those? Yup. Would the jet brick itself? No - it’d just get outdated, not dead. Again, no instant kill switch.

3/ ALIS—Autonomic Logistics Information System is the F-35’s original logistics brain. It tracks the jet’s health: engine stats, stress data, you name it. That info goes to a central server (US-managed) so crews can fix stuff and order parts. It’s a maintenance tool, not a joystick.

Analysis of the RAF A330 Voyager Fleet 1/25 The RAF’s A330 Voyager fleet underpins UK air mobility and air-to-air refuelling (AAR). Initiated via the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) programme, this fleet of 14 Airbus MRTTs aimed to modernise RAF capabilities. Yet, its potential is curtailed by procurement flaws.

2/ First, the myth: people think the US can flip a switch and shut down an F-35 mid-flight or on the tarmac. It’s a sexy conspiracy—total sci-fi. But there’s no evidence or tech basis for it. So where’d this idea come from? Two words: ALIS and ODIN.

4/ Then there’s ODIN—Operational Data Integrated Network. It’s the shiny new replacement for ALIS, more cloud-based and less clunky. Same deal: it logs data to keep the jet flying. But here’s the key, neither ALIS nor ODIN controls the plane. They’re support systems, not kill switches.

9/ Picture this: a radar fails. You need a new one. Without US-supplied parts, you’re stuck. The jet might technically fly, but no pilot’s risking it with a busted system. Safety rules mean it’s grounded until everything checks out. That’s the leverage.

The MBDA SPEAR 3 Missile Programme – Delays, Integration Challenges, and Strategic Shortfalls 1/25 The MBDA SPEAR 3 missile, intended to equip the UK’s F-35B with stand-off precision strike capability, is now delayed to the early 2030s. This thread examines the programme’s issues, its impact on Carrier Enabled Power Projection, and why the F-35B (currently) falls short of its strategic objectives.

The Prevail Partners Littoral Strike Ship: A Transformative Approach to Supporting the Future Commando Force 1/25 The Prevail Partners Littoral Strike Ship (LSS) offers a bold vision for the UK’s Future Commando Force (FCF). Designed to support agile, tech-driven Royal Marine operations, it rethinks naval platforms for modern littoral warfare.

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary Crisis: A Military Scandal Threatening the UK’s Maritime Nation Status Introduction As promised, please see below long thread on current status of RFA. As always, views are my own and facts can be corrected (references, over 30, can also be requested). As always @TomSharpe134 @WarshipsIFR @NavyLookout are great places to go for more detailed information. @BuchananLiz @IBallantyn @ShipWrektPod @thinkdefence @RDPHistory and others views welcomed. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), established in 1905, is the civilian-manned backbone of the Royal Navy (RN), enabling global operations through replenishment at sea (RAS), amphibious support, medical facilities, and missions such as humanitarian aid and counter-piracy. Its 10 vessels and 1,700 personnel are critical to the RN’s blue-water capability, including Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP), overseen by Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) of CEPP and incoming Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in November 2025. As of the 31st July 2025, only two RFA ships are operational, a crisis threatening the UK’s maritime nation status and global reach. The failure of RFA Argus to pass her Lloyd’s Register inspection in July 2025, rendering her “unsafe to sail,” exemplifies systemic issues, raising serious questions about her prior operational state and risk management. This essay (thread) examines the RFA’s role, systemic failures, the catastrophic risks of Argus sinking, and urgent reforms, including a Haddon-Cave-style review, decommissioning non-viable ships, securing maintenance contracts, and accelerating FSS and MRSS programmes within FY25/26 budget constraints (£55.7 billion, 2.3% of GDP), with an ambition (unlikely) to reach 3% (£72 billion) when funding allows.

The E-7 Wedgetail Programme: A Case Study in Strategic Procurement Failure Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. References in post 25. 1/25 The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) acquisition of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail was intended to restore sovereign airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability post-E-3D retirement. Instead, it has become emblematic of systemic deficiencies in Ministry of Defence (MoD) major project delivery. This thread attempts to examine the requirement, procurement strategy, risk management, and international ramifications using official reporting and parliamentary evidence.

Reimagining the Type 83: Beyond a Mere Replacement for the Type 45 1/25 The Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers are world-class anti-air warfare (AAW) platforms, but their planned successor, the Type 83 (T83), must not be narrowly defined as a replacement. Doing so risks limiting its design scope and affordability in a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

7/ Geopolitics feeds this too. The US has flexed muscle before—think sanctions or parts embargoes. Add some cybersecurity paranoia (SolarWinds, anyone?), and bam: people imagine a backdoor in the F-35. It’s a leap from “influence” to “remote shutdown.”

Project Ark Royal - Making Carrier Strike Credible 1/25 The RN’s Project Ark Royal aims to refit QE-class carriers with catapults and angled decks, boosting global strike power. A bold move to align with USN ops and counter rising threats. Here’s how it could reshape UK naval capability.

The F-35 (Variants) - The Discussion Continues… 1/25 The F-35 Lightning II variants; F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C represent a pinnacle of fifth-generation stealth technology. This thread compares their aerodynamics, thrust, power-to-weight ratios, and combat roles, with focus on UK/US differences and the F-35I.

Look where Val’s trigger finger is….it’s the little things (for those who know) 😎

Tribal-Class Frigates: Innovation, Adaptation, and Obsolescence in the Post-War Royal Navy 1/25 Introduction to the Tribal-Class Frigates As always, views my own and facts can be corrected. @CdrEricson - many thanks for the notes. The Tribal-class frigates, designated as Type 81 by the Royal Navy, represented a pivotal chapter in the evolution of British naval design during the transitional period following the Second World War. Conceived in the mid-1950s amid fiscal constraints and shifting strategic priorities, these seven vessels—HMS Ashanti, Eskimo, Gurkha, Mohawk, Nubian, Tartar, and Zulu—embodied the Royal Navy’s attempt to bridge the gap between wartime exigencies and the emerging demands of the Cold War era. As multi-role platforms, they were intended to replace specialised single-role ships, such as the Type 14 frigates, by incorporating versatility for colonial policing, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and limited air defence.

Conceptualisation, Lifespan, and Operational Legacy 1/25 The Type 23 frigate and Merlin helicopter deliver a key Royal Navy (RN) capability. This thread examines its conceptualisation, lifespan, and operational legacy, focusing on why it was extended beyond its design life and the resulting challenges.

Introduction to the SDR and UK Armoured Formations 1/25 The UK’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of envisions a British Army to deter Russia, focusing on the High North and Central Europe. With 148 Challenger 3 tanks (120mm smoothbore), 589 Ajax, and 623 Boxer vehicles, how can the UK deliver credible armoured capability? This thread explores formations, shortfalls, and what’s achievable. Views are my own, thread is to start the debate. Some say the Army lost out in the SDR - this thread hopes to inform that debate. For more detailed understanding of armour and its use I recommend @nicholadrummond

An Analysis of the Royal Navy’s Type 41 Frigate: Design, Technology, and Legacy 1/25 This thread examines the Type 41 Leopard-class frigate, a Royal Navy (RN) anti-aircraft (AA) platform of the 1950s, conceived to address post-WWII aerial threats. Its design, service, and obsolescence offer insights into naval adaptation.

BLUF – A Two-Division Model for the British Army 1/25 The British Army should restructure into two divisions—one tracked, one wheeled—each with three brigades of three all-arms battle groups, to meet Strategic Defence Review (SDR) requirements. This suggestion aims to spark debate on sustaining NATO commitments in the High North and Baltics while enabling operations in the Middle East and Africa. The Heavy Division would sustain armoured battle groups, with brigades and divisions as resource providers, supported by modern equipment like Challenger 3 and Boxer. Cultural and structural challenges, including resistance to change and logistical constraints, must be addressed. A phased timeline from 2025 to 2032 aligns with equipment deliveries. Without significant reform, the Army risks irrelevance in a volatile strategic environment. This thread has been put together following discussions with @thinkdefence and @MrSnaplegs last year (TD followed with a long read). @nicholadrummond @509298 @BO3673 @PhilipIngMBE @BenWallace70 thoughts welcome on this

Type 61 - The Air Direction Frigate 1/25 The Type 61 frigate, developed by the Royal Navy (RN) post-World War II, was a specialised air direction platform. Conceived in the 1950s, it reflected wartime lessons in a cost-effective design. This thread examines its evolution and significance.

Introduction to the NMH Programme 1/25 The UK’s New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme, launched in 2021, aims to replace aging rotary-wing platforms but is mired in financial necessity and poor decisions by the MoD, DG Helicopters, and DE&S. The Puma HC2’s withdrawal has left a capability gap, with RAF Benson now without aircraft.

As I finish DSEI Day 4 I thought I’d wander down to the MoD zone. SPEAR 3 and typhoon, with rumours the UK may have folded and taken a US weapon for F-35B….. @gregbagwell @edwardstrngr @BeakerBate @IBallantyn @NavyLookout @ValkStrategy @TomSharpe134

Introduction to the Sea Harrier’s Radar Legacy 1/25 The British Aerospace Sea Harrier, a Royal Navy STOVL jet, relied on its radar systems to achieve air superiority, notably during the 1982 Falklands War. The Ferranti Blue Fox and its successor, the Blue Vixen, represent a pivotal evolution in airborne radar technology, from mechanically scanned to first-generation AESA systems. This thread explores their development, operational use, advantages, limitations, and the Blue Vixen’s innovative integration with the Sea Harrier FA2, culminating in its role as a world-leading radar. As always, thoughts and opinions my own.

Reimagining the Type 83: Beyond the Type 45 1/25 The Royal Navy’s Type 45 (T45) destroyers, commissioned 2009-2013, excel in anti-air warfare (AAW) with advanced sensors and missiles. As they near end-of-life in the 2030s, the Type 83 (T83) emerges under the Future Air Dominance System (FADS). But what should it be?

Introduction to the NMH Programme As always, views are my own and facts can be corrected. Another “long read” thread - hopefully it’s logical to read and gets the points across. Comments as always, welcome and I do try and reply to all. 1/25 The New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme stands as a cornerstone of the UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) efforts to overhaul its rotary-wing capabilities in an era of tightening budgets and evolving threats. Initiated in 2021, this ambitious procurement seeks to procure up to 44 medium-lift helicopters, replacing a patchwork of ageing platforms including the Westland Puma HC2, Bell 212, Bell 412, and Airbus AS365 Dauphin. These legacy helicopters, some dating back decades, have served admirably in roles from battlefield transport to special operations, but their maintenance costs have skyrocketed, and reliability has waned, prompting the MoD to pursue consolidation. However, what began as a strategic modernisation has devolved into a cautionary tale of procurement pitfalls, marked by delays, bidder withdrawals, and scope reductions that highlight systemic issues within the MoD. This thread will try and dissect the programme’s requirements, trace its origins in the Joint Helicopter Command, expose its inherent flaws rooted in cost-saving imperatives, and explore the diverse roles it aimed to unify. It will delve into the bidders’ proposals, the erosion of competition leading to a single-source scenario, and draw stark parallels with infamous MoD failures like the AJAX armoured vehicle programme. Finally, I’ll try to assess the suitability of the lone remaining contender, Leonardo’s AW149, against proven alternatives such as the Sikorsky (Lockheed Martin) Black Hawk, while addressing the widening capability gaps and the human factors challenges in aircrew retention and retraining. By unpacking these layers, the aim is to foster informed discussion on whether NMH represents progress or yet another “MoD shambles,” especially as the programme’s NAO rating has recently slipped to “amber” amid ongoing uncertainties in delivery and workforce readiness.

Carrier Enabled Power Projection - Ambition and Reality. 1/25 Carrier-enabled power projection represents a vital element of the United Kingdom’s ambition to maintain a significant global military presence. This capability, which relies on aircraft carriers to project airpower across vast distances, has faced numerous challenges since its inception. Let’s explore its origins and ongoing difficulties (opinions my own).

Introduction to the FV4201 Chieftain Main Battle Tank 1/25 The FV4201 Chieftain, introduced in 1967, stands as a pivotal milestone in the evolution of British main battle tanks (MBTs), bridging the gap between the iconic Centurion and the later Challenger series. Designed to counter the growing threat of Soviet armor during the Cold War, the Chieftain was a technological leap forward, integrating a powerful 120mm rifled gun, advanced armour, and innovative design features such as the supine driver position. This thread tries to explore the Chieftain’s requirements, conception, design, and operational history, emphasising its engineering, crew experience, versatility, and its place in the lineage of British MBTs. While it achieved significant success in British service and select export markets, its export performance paled in comparison to the Centurion, reflecting both its strengths and limitations. Through an analysis of its gun, drivetrain, transmission, engine, armour, crew configuration, and upgrade potential, we highlight the Chieftain’s role as one of the most formidable tanks of its generation.

The RAF’s Airbus A330 Voyager: Aerial Refuelling Capabilities and Limitations 1/4 Compatible Aircraft The RAF A330 Voyager, equipped with a probe-and-drogue refuelling system, supports three key aircraft: the F-35B Lightning II, Eurofighter Typhoon, and A400M Atlas. These platforms, designed for drogue refuelling, seamlessly integrate with the Voyager’s capabilities, ensuring operational flexibility for these fleets.

Royal Air Force 2003 and 2035 - Comparison 1/25 The Royal Air Force (RAF) is vital to UK defence, securing skies and projecting power. This thread compares the RAF in 2003 and 2025, examining doctrine, aircraft numbers, weapons, deployments, combat capability, and value for money. Using MoD statistics, I try to assess if the RAF has improved or degraded and whether it meets Britain’s security needs. As always views are my own and in this thread I have provided links to where I have got the data and information from, however I am still willing to be corrected is someone has better information. I would recommend following @edwardstrngr @gregbagwell and @scottyeders if you want to keep updated with the RAF, the challenges it faces and for different points of view. My F-35 essay is available and is published on the @wavellroom website.

Royal Marines’ Transformation (Updated) 1/25 The Royal Marines are evolving to meet modern warfare’s demands, per the 2025 SDR, MRSS updates, and RUSI’s Amphibious Futures. This thread provides an update on the reorganisation, MRSS as over-the-horizon motherships, interim lift solutions, and NATO SOF alignment, adapting to contested littorals.

The TX Ship Concept - A lost opportunity? 1/25 The Steller Systems TX Ship, supported by Thales, redefines naval innovation. This 70m trimaran offers modularity, cost-effectiveness, and multi-role flexibility for crewed or uncrewed missions across all environments. In this thread I explore its design, versatility, and fit with RN’s Type 92/93 concept for modern ops.

The Evolution of Royal Navy Radars: 1940s to 1990s 1/25 The Royal Navy’s radar systems evolved remarkably from the 1940s to the 1990s, transforming naval warfare. This thread traces that journey, focusing on how each step brought more automation, greater range, and better accuracy. Let’s look into this technological journey.

CSG25 and Fleet Air Defence in CEPP 1/25 The UK’s Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG25), led by HMS Prince of Wales, embodies Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP). This thread clarifies fleet air defence as a core CEPP KUR, countering doubts, and covers CSG25 assets, RN limitations, and challenges like no AAR or MADL.

Following on From AH-64E 1/ Why would choosing Brimstone over JAGM boost the UK economy? Let’s break it down—jobs, industry, exports, and more. A thread on the £1.5–2.5B potential impact vs. the £740M JAGM deal.

Ah, the 27 nations of the EU....represented by Germany and France 🤷🏻‍♂️

Pilot shortage - Challenges for the RAF 1/25: The RAF faces a pilot shortage crisis in 2025—10-15% below needs. Recruitment struggles, retention falters, and demand may rise post-SDR. Issues like Puma’s retirement, E-7 relocation, and diversity scandals deepen the problem. Here’s why the RAF’s pilot gap could widen.

Introduction to the Westland Lynx Views my own, facts as always can be corrected. (Yes I am a fan of the worlds fastest helicopter - more in depth threads to follow) 1/25 The Westland Lynx stands as a testament to British ingenuity in rotary-wing aviation, emerging in the late 20th century as a multi-role helicopter capable of adapting to the demanding environments of both sea and land. Conceived amid Cold War imperatives for agile, shipborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and battlefield reconnaissance assets, the Lynx fulfilled a dual-service requirement for the Royal Navy (RN) and British Army (including the Royal Marines). Over its five-decade service life, it evolved through numerous variants, influencing export designs and paving the way for its successor, the AW159 Wildcat. This thread attempts to trace the Lynx’s journey from conceptual origins to operational deployment, emphasising its technical attributes, service-specific adaptations, combat record, international adoption, and transition to the Wildcat. It further compares the Lynx to American counterparts like the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk and UH-60 Black Hawk, evaluates its strengths and limitations, and assesses its enduring relevance in an era dominated by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The AS90 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer: Development, Service, and Legacy Following the “success” of my ARES essay I’ve tried something a little less contentious. Format is the same, fewer words (but the long essay does exist). As always views are my own and facts scan be challenged - everything is open source. @thinkdefence has some great long reads on some of the platforms mentioned below. Forward 1/25 The AS90 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (Gun Equipment 155mm L131) was a cornerstone of British Army artillery from its introduction in 1992 until its donation to Ukraine in 2023-2024. Designed to modernise the UK’s artillery during the Cold War’s final decade, it replaced outdated systems and integrated with the evolving armored force, including the Challenger MBT and Warrior IFV. This essay attempts to explore the AS90’s development, operational history, and eventual decline, comparing it to allied and adversary 152/155mm platforms. It examines the impact of short-term defence decisions that led to its atrophy and the British Army’s current artillery challenges, offering insights into replacement programmes and lessons from Ukraine’s use of the AS90.

New Thread: The U.S. Defence Industrial Complex & ITAR’s Long Arm 1/ The Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and Saab Gripen is evidence that Europe can build complex 4th Gen multirole jets built to rival U.S. dominance. But peel back the skin, and you’ll see US fingerprints. The US defence complex and ITAR still call shots. Here is a long thread.

Very Low Frequency Radio: Enabling Submerged Submarine Communication in the Modern Era Views my own, facts can be corrected. Sunday Essay Posted because TACAMO (E-6B) has been reported operating in the North Atlantic 1/25 Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio constitutes a pivotal technology in military communications, particularly for maintaining contact with submerged submarines without compromising their stealth. This thread attempts to examine the principles of VLF, its operational mechanisms, and its strategic importance for select nations. It addresses the technical specifications, including antenna dimensions, power requirements, and data transmission capacities, alongside implementations by the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. Further, it discusses global utilisation, interception by amateur radio operators, transmission metrics, and resilience in nuclear scenarios, concluding with an overview of the technology’s challenges and robustness.

The Ajax Ares Platform – A Deep Dive into British Army Modernisation and Procurement Challenges Forward (Short Version) As promised - shorter version. Views my own, data and facts - open source, references available if requested. Please read @thinkdefence and @nicholadrummond for more detailed analysis. 1/25 The Ajax Ares platform, part of the British Army’s Ajax family, aims to replace the ageing CVR(T) Spartan with protected mobility and overwatch capabilities. Developed under the troubled FRES programme, it’s mired in the “Ajax scandal.” This thread tire to explore Ares’ specifications, its expanded infantry role per Min DP (Maria Eagle’s) recent July (2025) statement, peer comparisons with CV90 and Bradley, and the MoD’s procurement woes. I’ll attempt to assess its suitability, emerging threats like FPV UAVs, and the impact on Treasury relations, arguing systemic failures threaten Army readiness.

Introduction to the CAPTOR Radar 1/25 The CAPTOR radar is the beating heart of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s sensor suite, enabling its air superiority and multi-role capabilities. Developed through a multinational effort, it has evolved from a Cold War-era concept to a cutting-edge system. This thread traces its journey from requirement to operational use, its technology, variants, and relevance today, with a focus on the UK’s investment in the ECRS Mk2. As always views are my own and posts can be corrected if errors are found. This is third in series of UK airborne radars (Blue Fox/Vixen, Fox Hunter and now CAPTOR). Larger radars will be covered soon (Search Water etc).

[1/15]Britain needs a defence strategy rooted in resilience and sovereignty by 2030. But let’s be real: rushing to 3% of GDP overnight isn’t pragmatic. The real win? Structural change—fixing how we spend, not just how much. Here’s a centre-right take that works.

The Evolution of Amphibious Warfare and the Role of the Commando Insertion Craft in the Future Commando Force 1/25 Amphibious warfare has shaped military strategy for centuries, enabling power projection from sea to shore. The Royal Marines, Britain’s elite amphibious force, rely on specialised landing craft to execute such missions, a practice rooted in historical operations like the D-Day landings of 1944.

Introduction to the F-35B in UK Service As always, views my own. This is an update on the F-35B in UK service. Comments and “corrections” welcome. 1/25 The F-35B Lightning II, a fifth-generation stealth fighter, forms a key part of the United Kingdom’s modern combat air capability, operated jointly by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN). As of October 2025, the UK has received around 48 F-35Bs, with intentions to acquire 138 in total, although recent plans include 12 conventional take-off and landing F-35As for the RAF. This fleet underpins the Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) strategy, allowing power projection from the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. Yet, the programme has faced delays, compromises, and questions about its fit. This thread attempts to explore the history of UK carrier aviation, the path to the F-35B, its design, limitations, strengths, and future role amid the 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). It also incorporates recent comments from the First Sea Lord (1SL) on transforming the RN into a war-fighting force adept at hybrid warfare through autonomous technologies as force multipliers.

Introduction to UK Military Deployment Capability (Simple version) 1/25 The (UK’s) armed forces are globally respected, but deploying a sustained, all-arms force overseas for over 180 days to support a friendly nation against a peer aggressor like Russia or China would test our limits. This thread assesses capabilities, challenges, and shortfalls.

The British Army, November 2025: A Force Asked to Do Too Much with Too Little Views my own, comments and corrections welcome. All information comes from open source. 1/25 Five months after the June Strategic Defence Review promised a “NATO-first” land power capable of deploying a full division to Europe within ten days, the British Army is smaller, lighter, and more fragile than at any time since the Napoleonic Wars. This thread attempts to examine one straightforward question: can the Army actually deliver the tasks the government has set for it, both at home and within NATO? I will try and walk through the commitments, expose the critical gaps in capability, and contrast the polished rhetoric of senior officers and politicians with the harder reality on the ground.

That always happens when the Israelis start winning, winning well and identifying the weaknesses in their enemies 🤷🏻‍♂️

The UK Strategic Defence Review 2025: Ambition vs. Reality 1/25 The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), launched by Labour in July 2024, aims to redefine Britain’s defence posture in a volatile world. Led by Lord Robertson, Gen. Sir Richard Barrons, and Dr. Fiona Hill, it promises a “root and branch” overhaul.

The British Centurion Tank – A Defining Main Battle Tank 1/25 Introduction to the Centurion The Centurion tank (FV4007), introduced in 1945, is a cornerstone of armoured warfare, embodying the main battle tank (MBT) concept. Born from World War II’s lessons, it balanced firepower, protection, and mobility, serving in 12 wars and with 18 nations for over six decades. This thread tries to explore its conception, design, service, and legacy, arguing it as the pinnacle of British tank design. Views my own, facts can be challenged and corrected. This is first in short series covering British MBT’s , Centurion, Chieftain, Challenger 1, Challenger 2 and maybe Challenger 3. It will finish with a thread on the evolution of tank warfare - including the British Army’s change from T56 to T44 tank regiments (doctrinal or to protect the 3 tanks regiments)?

Beer on Lusty though - size isn’t everything 🍻

The Ajax Ares Platform: A Comprehensive Analysis of British Army Modernisation, Peer Comparison, Procurement Challenges, and Strategic Missteps This is a long read (a shorter version will also be published). Views as always my own and facts or statements can be challenged. Source references are available on request. All sources are open. (I have background in this subject, I drafted some of the questions for the Defence Select Committee during their inquiry into AJAX. For more in-depth information on this, FRES and other land systems check out @thinkdefence and for Army strategic direction and organisation check out @nicholadrummond Forward 1/20 The Ajax Ares platform, a key component of the British Army’s Ajax family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), is designed to provide protected mobility and overwatch, replacing the ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR(T)) Spartan. Developed under the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme, the Ajax family has faced significant delays, technical issues, and controversies, collectively termed the “Ajax scandal.” This essay provides an in-depth examination of the Ajax programme’s original requirements, its historical context, and the technical specifications of the Ares variant, including its power plant, transmission, armour, C2 systems (with a focus on the delayed ZODIAC system’s role in intelligence dissemination), and limited weapon systems. It incorporates a recent statement by Defence Procurement Minister (Min DP) Maria Eagle, confirming Ares’ expanded role in infantry formations alongside Boxer, assessing its suitability, number of dismounts, and whether this reflects original requirements or poor strategic planning. The essay compares Ares with peer platforms—the Swedish CV90 and American M2 Bradley—to highlight its capabilities and shortcomings. It explores the MoD’s challenges, including noise and vibration issues, Parliamentary scrutiny, and the cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP). It critiques the platform-for-platform approach, contrasts it with the Royal Navy’s Crowsnest programme, and evaluates the implications of emerging threats like First-Person View (FPV) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Finally, it assesses the MoD’s damaged credibility and its impact on securing Treasury funding, arguing that systemic procurement failures threaten the British Army’s readiness.

Falklands Series - Human endeavour and a robust design The Type 12 1/25 I’ve been reflecting on the Type 12 frigate’s role in the 1982 Falklands War. Not as advanced as T21 or T22, its robust design & human element embodied by HMS Plymouth & HMS Yarmouth made it a cornerstone. A thread on its legacy & the human side of war.

For those that know me I’m all about balance so.. The Parachute Regiment: Origins, Evolution, and the Enduring P-Company Tests 1/25 We will examine the Parachute Regiment’s training, its historical inception, and the rationale for the Pre-Parachute Selection (P-Company) tests. We trace the regiment’s evolution since 1945 and the standards that define its elite airborne status.

We look forward to her appearing before a magistrate…..

Introduction to the Tomahawk Cruise Missile Views my own, facts can be corrected. Following President Trump’s hint on TLAM for Ukraine I’ve put this together. 1/25 The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) stands as one of the most enduring and versatile weapons in modern military arsenals. Developed by the United States Navy in the 1970s, it represents a paradigm shift in precision-guided munitions, enabling long-range strikes against land-based targets with remarkable accuracy. This thread tries to trace the TLAM’s evolution from its initial requirements through to concept, development, and deployment across land, sea, and air platforms. It examines its post-deployment advancements, its role within the US military and allied forces—particularly the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (RN) submarine-launched variant—and its classification as a strategic weapon. Furthermore, it explores future capability roadmaps, including ground-launched options, and considers its potential impact on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, especially in light of comments by President Trump. Finally, it concludes by analysing how such systems reshape battlefields by targeting adversaries’ centres of gravity with precision at extended ranges.

The UK’s Global Decline 1/25 The UK faces irrelevance in a new world order dominated by the US & China. Its obsession with legalism over pragmatism, territorial concessions, & policy paralysis on migration signal a nation sidelined, watching as global powers reshape the international system.

Thread: The Pilgrim RAF Fast Jet Future – A Strategic Assessment 1/ Amid global instability and the UK’s ongoing Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the future of RAF fast jets—here termed the “Pilgrim RAF Fast Jet Future”—requires careful consideration. This thread evaluates investment in Eurofighter Typhoon, F-35B, and GCAP within a 2.7% GDP defence framework. Opinions my own - facts can be challenged.

The U.S. Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Sites in June 2025: A UK Perspective 
1/25 On 21 June, the US struck Iran’s nuclear facilities (Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan) escalating the Israel-Iran conflict. This thread, from a British perspective, analyses the operation, its execution, and why the UK was sidelined, highlighting US dominance.

Problem is we are now swamped with various scandals - hopefully someone is making a list and writing to the various Ministers, officials etc formally so we get a proper response. We know we can no longer trust the @CommonsSpeaker based on PMQ’s this week and we know that those in power will never apologise for abusing it so we need to make sure the public are aware of it - more importantly we need to give them the tools to do something about it (regardless of political persuasion).

The UK SPEAR Weapons Programme: From Conception to Contemporary Challenges As always views are my own and facts can be corrected. Introduction 1/25 The Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) programme represents the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s efforts to modernise out air-launched munitions, ensuring the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) can deliver precise, standoff strikes in an increasingly contested battlespace. Initiated in the early 2000s, SPEAR emerged as a response to evolving threats and operational lessons from conflicts such as the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, where the limitations of existing weapons in engaging time-sensitive targets became evident. The programme is structured around incremental capabilities, each addressing specific requirements for precision, range, and adaptability. Managed under the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Complex Weapons Portfolio, SPEAR collaborates with industry primes like MBDA and BAE Systems (BAES), aiming to provide scalable effects from low-collateral damage to high-impact strikes.

F-35 - So what is MDP The F-35 Multinational Data Pool (MDP) centralises mission data files (MDFs) under U.S. control, delaying updates, limiting customisation, and tying operators to US logistics, challenges that hinder sovereignty and responsiveness. Israel overcame this with the F-35I Adir by securing autonomy to develop MDFs via a domestic lab and test jet, integrating custom C4 systems and weapons from Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit Systems, and establishing maintenance at Nevatim Air Base. Its US alliance ensured rapid MDF access when needed, like post-2023 Hamas attacks. The UK didn’t follow suit due to its role as a Tier 1 F-35 partner, contributing up to 15% of each jet (e.g., BAE Systems’ fuselage). Unlike Israel, a customer with unique security needs, the UK prioritised interoperability with NATO and the US led programme over independence. Creating our own MDFs would require costly infrastructure, replicating Eglin Air Force Base’s capabilities and risk disrupting the global supply chain, where UK parts are integral. Israel’s smaller fleet (39 F-35Is) and perpetual conflict justified its approach; the UK’s (up to) 72-96F-35Bs and broader NATO commitments made it impractical. Political will also differed: Israel leveraged its strategic position in 2010 negotiations, while the UK, bound by US contracts and NATO reliance, avoided challenging the program’s structure. Operational short term thinking?

Misinformation - person didn’t know it was wrong when they said it Disinformation - person knew it was wrong (a lie) when they said it. This is disinformation - Reeves knew. Remember this, they are being advised by some interesting people…..

Fleet Size Reduction Misstep 2/25 The programme was cut from 5 to 3 aircraft in 2021 to save costs, limiting AEW&C coverage to 8 hours daily, insufficient for NATO & UK needs. Critics call it “folly,” undermining capability. MoD & HM Treasury drove this controversial decision.

What about this guy?

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Status and UK Implications Part of my wider series on F-35. As always, views my own - facts can and should be corrected if wrong. This follows the GAO report. 1/25 The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter remains a critical asset in modern military aviation, blending stealth, advanced sensors, and networked systems to bolster combat prowess for the United States and its allies. As outlined in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report just released (and getting lots of attention), the programme has delivered over 1,100 aircraft since production commenced in 2006. However, it continues to face substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. Total acquisition costs now surpass $485 billion, an $89.5 billion rise from the 2012 baseline, primarily due to modernisation efforts. Sustainment costs over the aircraft’s 77-year lifecycle are projected at $1.58 trillion, pushing the overall expense beyond $2 trillion. For us (United Kingdom), a key (tier 1) partner contributing to development, production, and sustainment, these issues manifest as operational shortfalls and strategic risks. This thread tries to explore the F-35’s status, emphasising UK effects, drawing on the GAO report and other recent developments.

The RAF King Air Shadow Programme – A Deep Dive into Its Origins, Systems, Role, Challenges, and Future 1/25 Origins of the Shadow R1 The RAF’s Shadow R1 programme, based on the Beechcraft King Air 350CER, began as an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) in the 2000s to meet intelligence needs in Afghanistan. The conflict demanded real-time ISR to support ground forces, driving the need for a flexible, manned platform.

The Royal Marines Vanguard Strike Company and the Future Commando Force Introduction to the Vanguard Strike Company 1/14 The Royal Marines’ Vanguard Strike Company (VSC), a cornerstone of the Future Commando Force (FCF), redefines the Corps’ role in modern warfare. Established in 2020, it moves away from traditional infantry structures towards a dynamic, autonomous model suited for littoral and grey zone operations, testing new tactics and technologies. This thread explores the VSC’s transformative approach.

It doesn’t fit the current narrative 🤷🏻‍♂️

Doesn’t deliberate misinformation or disinformation get an account suspended for breaking the rules? @CommunityNotes To delete something that has a community note only to repost it shortly afterwards…..

25/25 Final Reflection In its unassuming strength, the Flower-class showed that humble platforms can win wars and build futures. Its legacy endures in every modern corvette and frigate, a testament to practical genius. Something that the MoD is grappling with now - do we go with mass or exquisite platforms 🤷🏻‍♂️ Opinions my own - facts can be challenged.

16/25: Despite her prowess, Ark Royal was decommissioned in 1979 amid defence cuts. This reflected a pattern of UK policy: short-term savings trumping long-term strategic needs.

3/25: The angled flight deck, a first in carrier design, enabled simultaneous launches and landings. This enhanced safety and efficiency, reflecting a response to the demands of heavier, faster jet aircraft post-WWII.