PLA Watch #24 is live! This issue focuses on ongoing efforts to hone “combat effectiveness” and cultivate “political reliability” throughout the PLA. We also examine a recently concluded 40-day combat training mission of the Liaoning task force – one of the longest deployments on record – which included accusations from China that the Japanese military “interfered” with PLA operations. @AsiaPolicy centerforchinaanalysis.asias…

When the operational culture of a navy/coast guard is to habitually violate COLREGS and norms of professionalism, this is the tragic result. The bow of China Coast Guard 3104 was completely destroyed colliding with PLA Navy Destoyer 164. The two sailors manning the bow of CCG 3104 likely died in the collision. 1/2

Here is the footage of the CCG vessel's unsafe and unprofessional maneuver to block the PCG vessel from replenishing the BRP Sierra Madre. China is a signatory to COLREGs, which is meant to prevent such unsafe practices. apnews.com/video/politics-ph… video courtesy of @AP.

Seeing a lot of "maritime law experts" commenting about the legality of US transits through the Taiwan Strait. Let me help: Here is a map; the text of UNCLOS, and an article parsing the legality of such transits. Please read first. un.org/en/global-issues/ocea… pacforum.org/publication/pac…

No, this is actually the CCG deliberately ramming the PCG vessel. The CCG’s actions and behavior are a threat to the safety and security of the PCG and its crew and should be condemned by all law-abiding nations.

The other shoe has dropped. CMC member and director of the political work department, Admiral Miao Hua, has been "suspended from duty," suspected of "serious violation of discipline." A 🧵 on what we know and implications for party-army relations. eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_21311…

Long 🧵on implications of PRC MinDef Li Shangfu being under investigation for corruption. I haven’t commented on this until recently because it was so speculative and unsubstantiated. But given confirmation in multiple media outlets and by U.S. officials with knowledge of the matter, it indeed appears Li is under investigation. Some initial thoughts on this. It’s a big deal for several reasons: 1) Xi hand-picked Li to be the next PRC MinDef 6 months ago. As such, Xi put a degree of political stock in Li. There has to be a level of embarrassment for Xi so soon after appointing him. 2) This would be the second high-profile minister taken down (other being Qin Gang) whose job is to interface with foreign country counterparts. IOW, he’s not some obscure official that can be swept under the rug with and no one noticing. 3) This follows the abrupt purge last month of two generals leading the country’s Rocket Force, also unprecedented. 4) The CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD) (formerly the General Armaments Department) has long been rumored a hotbed of corruption, but with surprisingly few top EED leaders having been detained or removed. In July, the CCP re-upped an investigation into the EDD and PLA procurement process dating back to October 2017. Li ran the EDD from 2017 to October 2022. 5) Agree with @jwuthnow that the retention of CMC Vice Chair Zhang You Xia, who ran the EDD before Li, suggests his status with Xi and within the PLA is sanctimonious. He’s one of only a few senior PLA leaders with combat experience and has close ties to Xi. If he emerges unscathed, suggests he is a “tiger too big to hunt.” 6) Suggests Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in the PLA nowhere near done. 7) It’s impossible to completely root out corruption in the PLA. They are a singular power structure within a monopolistic governance structure (CCP). Like the Corleone family, you can selectively remove actors whose corrupt practices become too large to ignore to 杀鸡给猴看 and hope the message gets through. But the organized crime system stays intact. 8) It will not greatly influence the trajectory of PLA modernization or combat effectiveness. The MinDef is a symbolic position with no operational influence over the PLA.

It's not "unification" if one party does not want to be unified. It's annexation.

Uh, this kinda seems like a big deal: A Chinese engineer, Guangzhi Cao, copied more than 300,000 files related to Autopilot source code from Tesla as he prepared to join China's Xiaopeng Motors Technology Company Ltd.

China can no longer claim plausible deniability over its maritime militia not being under the command and control of the coast guard and Navy. Gray zone tactics on full display.

As @Dimi reports, current CMC Vice Chairman, He Weidong (何卫东), was arrested over the last few weeks. Demetri consulted with 5 people familiar with the situation, including current and former US officials, so I believe the authoritativeness of his reporting. A long 🧵 on why this is a big deal for Party-army relations in China and a Taiwan contingency. ft.com/content/8226e1d9-2e4a…

The faces of the leaders of China’s Central Military Commission.

A 🧵 on this scoop from @PeterMartin_PCM and Jennifer Jacobs of @Bloomberg, which is a bombshell and changes my previous assessments of how much corruption in the PLA is affecting readiness. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

I have been following this new account on PLA issues. Not anymore. Ad hominem attacks on a respected China security expert are uncalled for. We are well past the stereotype that Chinese language skills are a prerequisite for understanding China. Unfollow.

The PLA Eastern Theater Command announced what appears to be a major exercise near Taiwan. Full statement: "The Eastern Theater Command spokesperson, Senior Colonel Shi Yi, said that starting from April 1, the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army organized the army, navy, air force, rocket force and other forces to organize ships and aircraft to approach Taiwan Island from multiple directions around the island, focusing on exercises in sea and air combat readiness patrols, seizing comprehensive control, sea and land strikes, and blocking key areas and roads, to test the actual combat capabilities of the theater's troops in joint operations. This is a serious warning and powerful containment of the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, and is a legitimate and necessary action to defend national sovereignty and maintain national unity." m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_for…

Alejano has become the foreign secretary the Philippines desperately needs - calling out Chinese actions for what they are: destabilizing.

Normally, such an incident would lead to reassessments of operational safety to ensure such accidents do not happen again. Unfortunately, for the PLAN and CCG, I don't think this will curtail risk-averse operations vis-a-vis the Philippines. In fact, the PRC will likely brand these two CCG personnel as heroes and double-down on unprofessional behavior at sea.

Bears repeating: CODELs, no matter the head, are routine exchanges between the US and Taiwan that have gone on for decades. The only party ratcheting up tensions is the PRC. Framing the trip as “provocative” and “escalatory” is unhelpful and only feeds the PRC narrative.

Right, which is why the vast majority of countries have their own One China “policy,” distinct from the PRC’s One China “principle,” and which specifically leaves out the part about Taiwan being a part of PRC. Stop conflating your policy with those of the int’l community.

Taiwan has quietly changed its air raid alert threshold from 70 to 24 nautical miles. A short thread on why and implications. scmp.com/news/china/politics…

🧵 on this unprecedented (and crucially important) @INDOPACOM video release of an unsafe intercept of a @usairforce RC-135 by a PLAN J-11. INDOPACOM has not done so in the past due to the sensitive nature of releasing such footage. Not any more. 1/4

I am pleased to share the launch of the @AsiaPolicy's Taiwan Policy Database (TPD) - a one-of-a-kind website housing one of the largest English language resources of original source documents, agreements, laws and exchanges on Taiwan policy from the perspective of China, Taiwan and the United States, from World War II to present. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

Counter-factuals that will be studied for decades on this crisis. Would China have reacted differently if: -Pelosi went in April -No leak -No POTUS public comments about it being a "bad idea" and that the "military doesn't support it." -Less sensationalist media coverage

The PLA’s decision to a)send a drone and take this photo of ROCAF troops over Kinmen, and b)leak this photo, says a lot about the current mindset of the PLA vis-a-vis ROCAF. It’s unvarnished PSYOPs, and a signal that the PLA has even less respect for the ROCAF than assumed.

Not to mention that Second Thomas Shoal has been found by an international tribunal to be a submerged feature within Philippine EEZ and thus Philippine sovereign territory.

Quietly, over the past two years, Xi Jinping has launched one of the largest purges of senior leaders in the PLA in recent memory, removing at least fourteen senior military leaders. The target of the purge appears to be China’s rocket and equipment development forces, but now also appears to be targeting the PLA Navy.

Serious Q: does any other country deploy its Ambassadors to threaten consequences if that country does not procure services and equipment from its “private” enterprises?

The purge of the PLA just got deeper. China has put its defence minister, Dong Jun, under investigation for corruption, according to current and former US officials familiar with the situation. This is not a normal shake-up, and I think more are coming.

Next 🧵 is on what Xi said in the 20th Party Congress about the military and the PLA. I see a lot of implications for the PLA here.

Can't wait to read "China's Quest for Military Supremacy," by @jwuthnow and Phil Saunders, by @politybooks, due out in March 2025. politybooks.com/bookdetail?b…

More tools of Chinese soft power coercion: the jacket worn by Tom Cruise with the Taiwanese flag -present in the original Too Gun - was scrubbed in the new Top Gun. Why? Because the movie was produced by a Chinese company.

Nice updated hi-res picture of Fiery Cross Reef, China's most developed in Spratlys. This used to be an underwater reef, folks.

Intentional or not, I believe this is the biggest blunder in Chinese foreign policy in years. It's an embarrassment for China, no matter how you slice it. Heads will roll in MOFA and the PLA.

I wrote about this in the Diplomat in 2016. Still relevant today. thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-…

First public evidence I've seen that Chinese military leadership expected pushback from US during its island-building campaign, and when it did not, proceeded ahead. Via @NBRnews Special Report by Adm. Greenert nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/p… h/t @SCS_Disputes

In other words, corruption in China’s military is not a case of a “few bad apples.” It is part of “doing business” in the PLA to a much greater extent than most other military organizations around the world, where the rule of law and checks and balances can serve to expose major acts of nepotism and corruption. Despite Xi’s best efforts, corruption in the PLA will endure and bedevil Xi and his successor for the foreseeable future. /END

DoD just released its China military power report. It included, for the first time, a "special topic" on recent corruption in the PLA, with some interesting tidbits. For example: 1) the removals "may have disrupted" PLA progress toward their 2027 military modernization goal; 2) many of the removals were due to "fraud" in weapons acquisition, in particular underground silos; 3) that many of the cases tie to Li Shangfu, who "would have signed off on all of the PLA’s weapons acquisitions" when he was head of the CMC EDD from 2017 to 2022; and 4) This investigation "likely resulted in the PLARF repairing the silos, which would have increased the overall operational readiness of its silo-based force." media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/1…

Strong statement by State Department, responding to China Coast Guard ramming of 2 Philippine Coast Guard vessels near Sabina Shoal. Says it “condemns the dangerous actions of the PRC,” which “employed reckless maneuvers, deliberately colliding with Philippe Coast Guard ships.”

The media hype surrounding Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan illustrates all that is wrong with US-TW relations. It only serves to heighten the perception of a potential crisis & frames the trip as provocative & escalatory, which is exactly what Beijing wants. It’s manufacturing a crisis.

Argentina Coast Guard again showing the world how to deal with Chinese fisherman fishing illegally in foreign country EEZs. Warn to stop, if no response, warning shots. Seems like it worked to stop the vessel.

Then there these two anecdotes from the IC: - missiles filled with water instead of fuel - vast fields of missile silos in western China with lids that don’t function in a way that would allow the missiles to launch effectively

Not gonna lie: this has been one of the hardest weeks of my life. My dad passed on Dec. 21 after a long battle with cancer. Today, my 9 year-old daughter tested positive COVID and my wife and I most likely got it. Appreciate any positive vibes.

Since the 6-member CMC was announced at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, 2 have been placed under investigation: Li Shangfu and Miao Hua. This alone constitutes a major failure for Xi's most trusted PLA leaders, who are thoroughly vetted beforehand.

I interpret this piece of news as evidence that the CCP is weaker and more vulnerable than thought, not strong and stable. A party that allows a leader through cult and power of personality to re-write the rules of succession is not a political party confident in itself.

Taken together, this is by far the largest shake-up of PLA leadership and SOEs involved in military procurement in recent memory. It suggests deep anxiety and disfunction within the ranks of China’s military, and a failure of trust between Xi and the military.

On Oct. 17, Xi visited PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) brigade (六十一基地611旅), in Chizhou, Anhui province. It was an important, symbolic meeting for Xi and the PLA, at a time when the PLARF is in the midst of one of the largest corruption purges in recent history. B-611 is home to nuclear-armed DF-26 IRBMs, which recently replaced the DF-21s, and of which Xi took several photos behind. A long 🧵 on the significance of the visit, with full video of the visit and full text translation at the end.

This is a major symbolic move - the first I’ve heard of - for a USCG cutter to accompany the US Navy in a transit through the Taiwan Strait.

Wow. This clip suggests that PLAN apparently allows the Liaoning to be underway in the SCS with NO escorts? Virtually unheard of for the USN to do this. These Vietnamese fisherman must have been impressed they were given a front row seat to the show.

These include the last three ministers of defense (Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu and Dong Jun); Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo – the commander and political commissar of the PLARF; former PLARF commander Zhou Yaning, head of the PLARF armaments department Lu Hong; former PLARF deputy Li Chuanguang; and Gen. Ding Laihang, the former Commander of the PLA Air Force until September 2021.

More importantly, it shows the global community how irresponsible the PLA is by undertaking such unsafe maneuvers, with Australia and Canada have experienced recently. The first step in pushing back is transparency regarding PLA behavior, which this footage clearly shows. /END

I forgot to add one more potentially important implication: Li's ouster would potentially remove a major impediment to U.S.-China mil-mil relations, as Li was under sanctions by the U.S. and China had signaled its unwillingness to engage the U.S. in leader-to-leader exchanges due to the "conditions not being right." I have to think DoD is happy about this development.

U.S. intel sources suggest corruption is so bad that Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case. Let that sink in....

Xi Jinping promoted He Hongjun (何宏军), executive deputy director of the Political Work Department of the CMC, to the rank of general. A short thread on the significance. eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_21311…

Let me guess. Xi said something like "国家统一、民族复兴的历史车轮滚滚向前，祖国完全统一一定要实现，也一定能够实现!" Like what he has said for years in major CCP party speeches? Not to be flippant, but this is nothing new nor newsworthy.

This picture, posted on Xinhua News, is the image that China seeks to highlight to PRC domestic audience - POTUS with a big grin, seemingly more eager to engage with Xi than Xi is with POTUS. Nuance matters.

Gee, if only the Philippines had a an ally with a formidable Navy with the capacity to help them protect their legitimate, sovereign maritime rights.

But this report has me questioning that assessment. If true, this level of corruption DOES affect readiness, which has major implications for Xi's military modernization goals, operational capabilities in a Taiwan contingency, and in other areas. /END

By @TheEconomist’s count, 70 countries have now officially endorsed both China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and, just as crucially, that China is entitled to pursue “all” efforts to achieve unification, without specifying that those efforts should be peaceful. Moreover, the vast majority of those countries have adopted that new wording in the past 18 months, after a Chinese diplomatic offensive across the global south. This is the result of China's assiduous efforts at cultivating relations with the Global South. economist.com/international/…

This only happens with the confluence of two conditions: 1) pressure to hit accelerated military modernization benchmarks (i.e. 2027) by Xi 2) endemic corruption Even still, it's mind-boggling that such egregious mistakes could be found in the PLA in 2024

There are also rumors that former PLAN political commissar Qin Shengxiang and current political commissar Yuan Huazhi are under investigation. renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2…

Xi expels 4 more PLA generals: People’s Armed Police commander Wang Chunning (王春宁); rocket force disciplinary chief Wang Zhibin (汪志斌); Zhang Lin (张林), head of the Logistics Support Department under the Central Military Commission; and Gao Daguang (高大光), political commissar of the CMC’s Joint Logistics Support Force. scmp.com/news/china/military…

With the reforms in 2015, Xi has attempted to stabilize what is considered an inherently unstable and delicate symbiotic relationship between the Party and the military in one of the world’s last remaining modern Communist-Leninist governance structures. While such initiatives may expose more cases of graft, however, they have not succeeded in rooting out corruption at a systematic level. This is because deep, endemic issues in party-army relations predate Xi, and indeed have existing since the Mao Zedong era, whereby kickbacks and buying and selling of promotions have been standard practice for decades..

SOE executives involved in arms procurement, along with engineers and scientists, have come under scrutiny as well. In December, 2023, the CPPCC revoked the memberships of three senior leaders of Chinese military-industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs): Liu Shiquan, chair of weapons manufacturer China North Industries Group, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp chair Wu Yansheng, and China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp executive Wang Changqing. In the same month, Hu Wenming, a former chairman of China Shipbuilding Industry Co., who oversaw the country’s aircraft carrier development program, was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment on corruption charges more than three years after Communist Party inspectors first opened a probe against him. Finally, on October 11, 2024, Xiao Longxu, the former chief engineer of the rocket force’s top research institute and a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, was removed as a representative of the CPPCC.

Just to clarify on my earlier tweet, since some have misinterpreted it: -@BonnieGlaser can speak Chinese -Chinese language is important for understanding China -inability to speak the language of a country does not preclude informed analysis of said country.

When asked about PRC research vessels in Vietnam's EEZ, PRC MOFA said, with no irony: "there is no such thing as entering another country's EEZ," because China has undisputed sovereignty over the Nansha islands and adjacent waters (i.e., the entire SCS). fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jz…

Today, the @AsiaPolicy Center for China Analysis unveils a new program: Brothers Forever: Unpacking the Conundrum of China-Russia Relations. This program illuminates a consequential issue in geopolitics - the China-Russia relationship - and seeks to answer the big questions in modern China-Russia relations, such as: What explains the current close partnership between the two, and what drives them apart? How has the Ukraine War changed bilateral relations? What can we expect from the Putin-Xi relationship going forward? asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

First, as @neilthomas123 said in @dimi’s report, He’s purge would be the first of a serving uniformed vice-chair of the CMC since General He Long in 1967. Overall, since 2012, based on my own calculations, Xi has removed at least seventy-eight senior PLA officials at the 2-star (Lt. Gen/Rear Admiral) level and above. This includes eight serving and former members of the CMC. This is unprecedented in PRC history, and a sign of a major trust and corruption problem within the PLA.

Pleased to publish a new @AsiaPolicy CCA paper on Chinese views of escalation and crisis management. I examine PLA views of “effective control” (有效控制) and implications for U.S.-China security dynamics. A short 🧵on my findings. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

Safe to say Interpol will never have another Chinese official as its head. Larger question: what is ripple effect on other international bodies considering Chinese nationals as their head in the future?

Indonesia and Philippines reportedly agree on EEZ boundary during bilateral meeting at ASEAN Summit.

In the next few days, I have a @RANDCorporation report on the “gray zone” challenge from Russia and China. It’s one of the first major studies that involves field research in 11 countries and proposes a menu of mil and non-mil response options. Keep an eye out later this week!

Here is what I wrote on the CMC lineup from Oct. 2022. A lot has changed since then. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

Thread: this report that Kenya risks losing the Port of Mombasa to China maritime-executive.com/artic… is another domino to fall within China’s debt-for-port swap program that is highly concerning. 1/

A short 🧵 on how Taiwan was framed in Xi's 20th Party Congress Work Report (PCWR).

“Under your leadership, the Russian Federation has been firm in facing the Western sanctions, which demonstrates that no challenges can overburden you or Russia. You have China’s respect for that." -Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, in meeting with Putin. Zhang is China's top military leader.

🧵 on PLA personnel removals announced at 7th session of the 14th NPC (thanks to @NPC_Observer for flagging). The NPC, in one fell swoop, quietly removed several senior leaders of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD). Here they are, with my take on implications for the PLA. 1) Zhang Zhenzhong (张振中) deputy chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department and previous deputy commander of the PLARF.

🧵 Yesterday in Beijing, the U.S. and China held the inaugural "China-US Maritime Consultation Mechanism" (首轮中美海洋事务磋商), co-chaired by Hong Liang, Director of the MOFA Boundary and Ocean Affairs Dept, and Mark Lambert, China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. No readouts yet from other side. hqtime.huanqiu.com/article/4…

It’s clear by now that something major occurred in the PLA Rocket Force. Likely corruption that affected its missile or nuclear forces/capabilities/readiness, or an intel leak.

Canada gets tough with China over canola ban that ‘defies science’, demanding proof of contamination scmp.com/news/world/united-s… Your daily reminder that China engages in petty, tit-for-tat tactics and economic coercion when it is upset with a country about something.

Terrible idea. The only country happy about this decision is China.

A few initial observations about why He’s removal will be so impactful. First, given his background in the ETC, He likely was one of Xi’s most important advisors on a Taiwan contingency. One has to wonder what impact, if any, his removal will have on the PLA’s Taiwan planning. It may or may not have an impact, it is hard to say. And second, Xi appears to be targeting the Fujian “clique,” with Miao Hua and He Weidong both having moved up the ranks in the 31st GA. There may indeed be a targeted purged taking place of PLA officers having overlapped with Xi in the 31st (now the 73rd) Group Army, in Xiamen, Fujian, and possibly the Eastern Theater Command. One wonders if this will have an impact on ETC contingency planning for a Taiwan scenario. /END

In today's climate, it is almost comical to watch Dai Bingguo's speech at the 2009 S&ED: "the U.S. need not worry about China's strategic intentions. We will not invest heavily in defense. The U.S. can sleep well at night...(playfully) are there still some who are not reassured?"

China MFA SPOX statement on Ukraine should put to rest any questions about PRC views on the crisis. To summarize: 1) It's the U.S's fault 2) The U.S. is exacerbating the issue 3) China will never join sanctions 4) China's position is not contradictory fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_66…

Rep Mike Waltz has been tapped to be Trump's National Security Advisor. Here are some notable quotes from Rep Waltz on China:

I am not against a new hotline between the @INDOPACOM commander and the PLA Eastern Theater Command. But we shouldn't hold any illusions that it will fundamentally change how the PRC approaches crisis communications. A short 🧵on why.

This is extremely dangerous and unprofessional by the PLAN helicopter pilot. Might be the closest unsafe intercept I have seen by the PLA. One of these days, this will lead to an accident in the air.

My first @AsiaPolicy article examines the new CMC leadership and what it tells us about Xi’s military and security strategy. A short 🧵on the main findings. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

The PLA's firing of 16 ballistic missiles east of Taiwan is much more provocative than in 1995. Appears to be DF-15 (h/t @fravel). Several flew over Taiwan. 3 NE ones landed very close to Japan's Ryukyu islands. There is sure to be strong U.S. and possibly Japanese response.

Thread: There is much confusion about the new SCS policy shift. To clarify, the new policy is NOT rejecting ALL PRC territorial and maritime claims in the SCS, contrary to what is out there in the press.

Scoop: Biden and Xi prepare to restart military-to-military channels axios.com/2023/11/08/biden-x… Important scoop by @HansNichols and @BethanyAllenEbr. Short 🧵 on implications for US-China mil-mil (hint: keep your expectations low).

Excited to announce the publication of “China 2024: What to Watch,” a report by @AsiaPolicy's Center for China Analysis, that looks at the big picture of what to expect in China in 2024. A short 🧵 on our findings. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

For more on Li and new CMC see my CCA piece from Oct. 2022: asiasociety.org/policy-insti…

I score recent ASEAN Chairman's Statement a "4" of 8 on SCS. Very disappointing. Most importantly, no mention of "militarization," "land reclamation,""eroding trust," or ""took note of concerns of some leaders." ASEAN slowly ceding its last weapon against China -- words.

Two noteworthy developments coming out of the 4th Plenum. 1) Zhang Shengmin elevated to Vice Chair of Central Military Commission; and 2) the addition of a 10th (!) PLA General under investigation: Zhang Fengzhong (张凤中), Director of Political Work Department of the PLA Rocket Force. Two takeaways: The PLARF is now completely purged of senior generals and will experience major turnover with new generals in the coming years; and 2) Zhang is a likely a placeholder for a new, younger CMC Vice Chair to be appointed during the next Party Congress. scmp.com/news/china/military…

My take on Huawei news: eventually security concerns are going to push Huawei completely out of markets in developed democracies. The competition is going to be in 2nd and 3rd-world markets that desperately need IT infrastructure and are willing to overlook security concerns.

“Over two decades, the People’s Liberation Army has more than tripled the value of its military infrastructure on Hainan and on reclaimed reefs in the South China Sea, according to an exclusive analysis of some 200 military sites by the Long Term Strategy Group (LTSG), a defense consultancy commissioned by the Defense Department that was authorized to share its analysis of open-source data with The Washington Post. Overall, the value of the military infrastructure on Hainan and in the South China Sea exceeded $50 billion as of 2022, according to the researchers. That’s more than the value of all U.S. military facilities in Hawaii, LTSG said.” Nice weapons piece by @nakashimae in @washingtonpost.

Yao Ming at the NPC looks like me sitting in my daughter’s playhouse sipping “afternoon tea.”

Happy to share my @RANDCorporation report "Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War" rand.org/pubs/research_repor… with Michael Mazarr, Jeffrey Hornung, @StephaniePezard, Anika Binnendijk, & @martakepe.

On the front lines against China, the US Coast Guard is taking on missions the US Navy can't do businessinsider.com/in-china…