Policy analyst @i_montaigne Geopolitics of technology, economic security, maritime affairs #China #Japan #Taiwan #EU. Former @SIPRIorg Beijing.
Paris, Taipei
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Response by Defense Minister Reznikov from Ukraine. 1. I’ll try to be polite. 2. We did not discuss this. 3.
It sounds like a Russian plan. 4. The result of Minsk was full-scale invasion. #SLD23
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Fil: quelques observations sur l’immense opération de guerre psychologique vis-à-vis de Taiwan et des Etats-Unis initiée par la Chine à l’occasion de la visite de Nancy Pelosi. 1/14
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A Chinese view on the border clashes with India: thread presenting the key points of a CICIR analysis: “The behavioral logic of India’s tough diplomacy toward China”. Hu Shisheng is a leading expert of South Asia from the Ministry of State Security, his voice carries weight.
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There is something really moving about Taiwanese democracy which everyone will experience differently. To me, it’s knowing how hard earned it is, and the faith that the system protects individuals from abuses of state power. Happy Election Day, Taiwan!
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General Prabowo Subianto proposes a peace plan for Russia-Ukraine war. 1. Immediate ceasefire. 2. Withdrawal by 15 km of troops from both sides, creation of a demilitarized zone in between. 3. Immediate UN peacekeeping deployment. 4. UN referendum in occupied territories. #SLD23
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Serious indictment in the French semiconductor sector: illegal transfers of dual-use technologies to China and Russia, with fake end-users certificates, hidden direct links to the Chinese arms industry... Something to watch lepoint.fr/monde/un-patron-f…
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A timely release for this new NDU volume on the PLA and Taiwan. Proud to have contributed a chapter on China’s options for military coercion. Thanks to @jwuthnow and other editors. ndupress.ndu.edu/Publication…
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China's Taiwan policy is gradually undergoing a major shift in priority, from opposing independance to seeking unification. An interpretation of Xi Jinping's approach by Wang Yingjin, director of the Cross-Strait Relations Research Centre of Renmin Uni. aisixiang.com/data/128387.ht…
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Putin visiting the Harbin Institute of Technology is a meaningful choice. It says two things: Sino-Russian solidarity against US sanctions, and deepening access to Chinese defense technology for the Russian arms industry.
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EU-China Strategic Dialogue: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell. I have trouble understanding on what intelligence the assertion that China does "not have military ambitions and they do not want to use force" is based europa.eu/!PP86QG
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Amazing that the cost of construction of the Fudan campus in Budapest ($1.8bn) is more than the Hungarian government spent on its entire higher-education system in 2019. bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-…
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Key points from a rare Chinese analysis of border conflict with India by Yang Siling, vice director of Institute for South Asian Studies at Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, "The Bloody Conflict in the Galwan Valley: India's Dangerous Game and Its Impact on CHN-IND Relations”
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This is unusual - French sale of a decoy launcher to the Taiwanese navy for $26.8 million causing China's public concern. China's France policy has changed, and the Taiwan issue is on top of Beijing's agenda again newsinfo.inquirer.net/127391… via @inquirerdotnet
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France is making it on the sorry list of targets of China’s « wolf warrior diplomacy », with the Chinese Embassy posting insulting articles backed by fake news and authored by an anonymous diplomat. Why? Quick thread nitter.app/AmbassadeChine/status/…
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General Qiao Liang, author of Unrestricted Warfare, on invading Taiwan: "We shouldn’t make this the top priority. Beijing would need to mobilise all its resources and power; huge price to pay and it would jeopardise China’s goal of national rejuvenation” scmp.com/news/china/military…
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This should accelerate Europe's discussion on transatlantic cooperation on China. A US executive order for a national supply chain strategy in semiconductors, EV batteries, rare-earth and medical products, with Australia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Int…
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Strong words regarding PLA’s reluctance to engage in crisis management by Sec. Austin. The right time to talk is “every time, it’s anytime, it’s now”. “Dinner handshake not a substitute for engagement” #SLD23
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Cancelling such a visit after a leak is losing twice, in the eyes of Beijing and in the eyes of Taipei. politico.eu/article/eu-intel…
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Wang Jisi's new piece is courageous. Title: 跳出大国关系窠臼把握国际趋势大框架, Break free of great power relations and grasp the bigger framework of international trends. It is as close as you can get as advocating a complete change of course for China aisixiang.com/data/123537.ht…
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The whole statement is music to the ears of the Chinese leadership. Also to note, 5G is presented again in terms of reciprocal market access with China rather than in terms of building a critical infrastructure for Europe's future.
Amid US-China tensions as the main axis of global politics, the pressures to ‘choose sides’ are increasing. In rougher seas, the EU’s own interests and values should be our compass.
Read my blog: europa.eu/!yn33Hg
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Taiwan’s safety a “red line”, "So far, I haven't yet seen a clear policy on Taiwan from Joe Biden. I would like to hear it quickly, then we can also prepare our response on Taiwan in accordance” - A strong statement from Japan’s Defense Ministry reuters.com/article/us-japan…
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Taiwanese company Prologium to set up battery gigafactory in France. An investment of 5.2 billion euros is more than double the stock of Taiwanese FDI in the EU. Enough to change the EU narrative that there’s not enough Taiwanese investment in Europe? reuters.com/business/autos-t…
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Newly released map of flagship projects in the Indo-Pacific as part of Global Gateway
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Inauguration at the China Institute for International Studies in Beijing today of the Center for the Study of Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought, the "newest accomplishment of Marxism in the diplomatic area in the 21st Century" fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t179…
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#AUKUS and Australian nuclear submarines: this is about deterring China's use of force in the context of the US having lost air and sea supremacy inside the first island chain. My analysis, translated in the language of our executioners. institutmontaigne.org/en/blo…
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Taiwan 🧵: what if an victory of William Lai but with a bad score and without a legislative majority was not such a bad outcome from Beijing's perspective ? A bit counterintuitive but if the vote took place today, that would be the outcome so let's ask the question.
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The EU's China policy on the eve of 2022: a divided Germany in a divided Europe, over two issues (1) coercion and anti-coercion; (2) human rights and import control, to remove forced labor from supply chains. Tough job ahead for the Commission and the French presidency.
Siemens CEO basically saying Germany should not ban forced labour in (solar panels) value chains, because that may hamper the fight with the climate change
It's important to set one's priorities straight 😬
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This time, it's official: German warship to sail through the South China Sea this summer. str.sg/JVXm
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Wei Jianguo, a former vice-Minister of Commerce, now affiliated with Peking University, on why the Comprehensive Investment Agreement will in the end be ratified by the EU. He has three arguments mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3NKNXIWjK…
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China’s visa waiver for the citizens of the five largest EU economies brings concrete benefits, but we should also be clear that it is part of a plan to neutralise the economic security and de-risking agenda proposed by the European Commission. brusselssignal.eu/2023/11/ch…
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I take it as a compliment that my report on China’s semiconductor industry is on sale for 10 RMB (!!) on the Chinese internet. It is quite comforting however that it can also be downloaded for free on the website of Institut Montaigne.
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Five points on Macron’s attempt at a free ride on the third way in Beijing. Limited gains, at the cost of European and transatlantic coherence. asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Int…
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The Global Times must be a bit jealous
Taiwan is the most dangerous place on Earth. A war over the island would be a catastrophe: America and China must work harder to avoid it. Our cover this week econ.st/32WuKZN
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China shows limited interest in multilateralism; it is not in the top 8 money donators to COVAX but has pledged 10 million doses provided that the vaccines developed by Sinovac and Sinopharm are approved by WHO - decision mid-April.
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Such a significant evolution to have Japanese government officials tell the press that Japan and the US have decided to "closely cooperate in the event of a military clash between China and Taiwan" japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/0…
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New publication - The Weaks Links in China's Drive for Semiconductors. China has wild ambitions to reduce its dependance on foreign suppliers and powerful industrial policies, the West has chokepoint technology. institutmontaigne.org/en/pub…
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5,9%, far from the Made in China 2025 goal to reach 40% in 2020 - 15.9% of ICs sold in China in 2020 were made locally, including 10% in fabs by TSMC, SK Hynix, Samsung etc. technode.com/2021/02/19/chin…
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A rare French public recognition of transfers of Chinese defense electronics to the Russian arms industry. reuters.com/world/china-supp…
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Not the first time one hears of Japan as “Taiwan’s Poland” in a war scenario, but this time this comes from the former commander of Japan’s Western Army, covering the defense of Kyushu and Okinawa. asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Pic…
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Causing serious damage to US-France trust was a price the Biden administration obviously was willing to pay. Can it be repaired? French interets in the Indo-Pacific stay, the French assessment of Chinese strategic intentions won't change, no question about that.
“The 🇺🇸 choice to exclude a 🇪🇺 ally and partner such as 🇫🇷 from a structuring partnership with Australia, at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region (...) shows a lack of coherence that 🇫🇷 can only note and regret.”
tinyurl.com/jvhm2y9f
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Xi’s Europe visit shows the EU needs an economic intelligence service – an op-ed for @Euractiv @i_montaigneEN euractiv.com/section/china/o…
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So there's a 1908 novel, 新纪元, in which China attacks the West with balloons. 🙃 sohu.com/a/474596143_1001409…
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The real win for the US is to have an EU country sign up to the strategic goal of maintaining a "leading edge" (to quote Mark Rutte), and not only of preventing access to semicon technology by military end-users in China. ft.com/content/baa27f42-0557…
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Xi Jinping in Qiushi: "After decades of peaceful rule, many party members and cadres have not experienced the test of life and death, lacking the tempering of brutal struggles and harsh environments". scmp.com/news/china/politics…
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Unequivocal language by French Foreign Minister: "According to information that we read or have, there are imprisonment camps for Uighurs, mass detentions, disappearances, forced labour, forced sterilisations, the destruction of Uighur heritage" france24.com/en/20200721-fra…
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Taiwan, the only issue for which an otherwise spontaneous PM Kishida turns to a prepared document. But Japan introduces stronger G7 language on Taiwan, and sees the Tokyo opening of a NATO office as helpful to raise awareness within NATO about Taiwan. asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Th…
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Four observations on the European Commission's "Recommendation on critical technology areas for the EU's economic security for further risk assessment with Member States" defence-industry-space.ec.eu…
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According to @grzegorzewskif, Taiwanese companies have invested as much in the EU in the past four years as in the previous 40 years. It’s true that a new dynamic has started.
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Lithuania as a major credibility test for the US and the EU - backing down under pressure would have global ramifications. wsj.com/articles/lithuania-i…
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The Taiwanese Defense Ministry finally issues an aggregated number of scrambles: the Air Force has scrambled 4,132 times so far in 2020, up 129% compared to all of 2019 reut.rs/3jEEDSw
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Mark Valencia (!) warning France of "unpleasant Chinese reaction" if the French Navy sails through the Taiwan Strait, in accordance with international law, has something mind boggling. And no, no plan to sail through Qiongzhou Strait... scmp.com/comment/opinion/art… via @scmpnews
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One of the central argument in China's emerging narrative to differentiate Ukraine from the Taiwan Strait is to argue that Russia-Ukraine relations are state-to-state while cross-strait relations take place within a "one China framework".
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Senior Colonel Zhou Bo's description of the inevitability of closer Europe-China ties as a result of #COVID19 is close to psychological warfare. A West "not in disarray but falling apart", China as "Good Samaritan" and true supporter of multilateralism scmp.com/comment/opinion/art…
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Pari risqué, un peu désespéré vu le risque d’effets contre-productifs, comme en 1996 et en 2000. L’intimidation à laquelle se livre la Chine face à une visite qui ne change en rien le statu quo est un aveu d’échec sur les méthodes plus douces pour favoriser l’opposition. 11/14
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Negotiation of the EU-China Investment Agreement “concluded in principle”: a premature look at the gains and the risks accepted by the two parties. I find it quite asymmetric, but stand ready to be corrected
The EU has the largest single market in the world. We are open for business but we are attached to reciprocity, level playing field & values.
Today, the EU & China concluded in principle negotiations on an investment agreement.
For more balanced trade & business opportunities.
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Cette question de l’équilibre des déterminations est centrale. La guerre russe en Ukraine a démontré à la Chine que les sociétés démocratiques, malgré le consumérisme et l’hédonisme, ne capitulent pas nécessairement en quelques jours. 4/14
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Le Yucheng, the man who was demoted for being openly too pro-Russian. It tells us that China wants to calibrate the diplomatic messaging and avoid excesses but it does not tell us that Chinese foreign policy is turning less pro-Russia. asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Pic…
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Not a coincidence that the 5 EU countries selected are the EU's top 5 economies and China's top 5 trading partners in the European Union. From a divide-and-rule angle (not the only angle, people-to-people exchanges matter), quite creative ahead of the EU-China summit.
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The EU-China investment agreement is in the refrigerator for an indefinite period of time, but the EU’s framework for screening foreign investment has been operational for 8 months now. My rather upbeat piece on a useful tool to defend European interests. institutmontaigne.org/en/blo…
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Transatlantic trends 2020: "most Americans (57%), French (58%) and Germans (61%) now view China’s rising influence negatively, with an increase in about 10 points in each country after the Covid-19 outbreak" institutmontaigne.org/en/pub…
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Forcing airlines to list Taipei as an airport in China reall produces effects. On my way to Taipei with Air France, I was asked twice by airport staff: “In China?”. Unthinkable two years ago.
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“We don’t call it decoupling because for some people, the meaning of decoupling is too sharp. But in the end, it is a different description of the same process” - amazing how CCP talking points find their way inside the European debate. scmp.com/news/china/diplomac…
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Heard today the view from a knowledgable German friend that getting pork import restrictions lifted was the only tangible deliverable of Scholz’s China visit. Well it turns out that it is withheld by the Chinese side until Berlin moves on Huawei’s access to German 5G network ⬇️
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Trois points pour conclure. 1. Le risque d’incident est réel. J’ai souvent entendu d’interlocuteurs chinois « il n’y a pas d’incidents, il n’y a que des décisions politiques ». Je me corrige donc : un accrochage pourrait servir les objectifs décrits dans ce fil. 12/14
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3. Il y a un opportunisme chinois, qui rappelle le terme de « reactive assertiveness » autrefois utilisé pour décrire sa transformation du statu quo en mer de Chine du Sud et de l’Est. Car il s’agit bien de transformer le statu quo. 14/14
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Some good questions to which we will try to bring some answers today: What factors are driving France, Germany and the UK to reach out to Japan? Why is Japan reciprocating, and with what goals? Where are these trends heading? rand.org/events/2021/11/02.h…
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Xi endorsing strategic autonomy, a kiss of death for French influence inside Europe and in the transatlantic partnership🤔
At a time when Germany enters a post-Merkel era, Xi reached out to Macron.
China, he said, hopes "France will play an active role in promoting the healthy and stable development of China-EU relations."
"France is correct in advocating the EU's strategic autonomy," Xi added.
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The CEO also said “Very simply, we should ask the European Union to enforce the same conditions in Europe for Chinese manufacturers under which we, the western manufacturers, compete in China”.
Stellantis (Peugeot, Citroen, Fiat, Opel, Chrysler) considers pulling out of car manufacturing in China, resorting to maintaining "soft assets" and exporting to that market #decoupling
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Press statement by President von der Leyen following the trilateral France-EU-China meeting. A clear summary of the current status of the relationship with China from an EU perspective. Great she was able to voice this during Xi’s state visit to France. ec.europa.eu/commission/pres…
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Our series on public policies options in East Asia against #Covid_19 starts with Taiwan: rapid action, precise situation awareness on all cases, a strict quarantine policy, a nationalized mask economy, no lockdown, no massive testing @i_montaigneEN
institutmontaigne.org/en/blo…
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In depth Caixin report on Wuhan virus and how the initial cover up was a decisive moment. Hubei radiologist: "Doctors and disease prevention officials have known how serious it is, but none dared to speak out. We should have taken the risk and spoken up." asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Ca…
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Coercion in the Taiwan Strait - what China seeks to achieve today with military pressure, the risks of calculated escalation in 2021, and why Europe needs to anticipate now how it would respond to crisis scenarios. institutmontaigne.org/en/blo…
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La Chine a intérêt à procéder par étapes, en érodant la détermination de Taiwan et des Etats-Unis. C’est le sens de ces manœuvres, qui portent en elles un risque d’accrochage que la Chine assume et fait porter sur les troupes TW et US qui surveilleront ses exercices. 8/14
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Meng’s admissions confirm the crux of the government’s allegations that Meng and her fellow Huawei employees engaged in a concerted effort to deceive global financial institutions, the U.S. government and the public about Huawei’s activities in Iran. justice.gov/opa/pr/huawei-cf…
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“It’s normal that ... we want a European solution” because of the importance of “the security of our communication” - Macron. First time the European preference argument is so clearly articulated by a political leader abcnews.go.com/International…
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L’enjeu est double pour Pékin : (1) démontrer la détermination de la Chine à annexer Taiwan par la force en utilisant tout élément déclencheur susceptible d’être présenté comme une modification unilatérale du statu quo par Taiwan (ce n’en est pas une). 2/14
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Documentary aired today features a note leaked by the French domestic intelligence services which raises the alarm about intangible technology transfers through research cooperation with China, and singles out @Ifremer_fr a world class oceanic institution francetvinfo.fr/economie/ind…
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To sum up, the entire analysis is based on assumptions regarding India's strategic intentions regarding Aksai Chin and India's perception of a window of opportunity. Of course, this lacks a precise chronology of facts to document the border clash and PLA's actions. FWIW!
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Impressive collection of academic work on the CCP edited by @chloe_froissart and @doyon_jerome which amazingly can be downloaded for free. 🌟 press.anu.edu.au/publication…
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In the mail today. No Shinkansen for me in 2021 but at least my piece on China policy and Europe-Japan relations will do the travel at the invitation of Wedge, the Tokaido Shinkansen line premium magazine
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Some thoughts on the US-Japan-Netherlands agreement to restrict exports of semiconductor technology to China. 1. This is about military A.I, but collateral damage on civilian users is inevitable. institutmontaigne.org/en/ana…
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Thierry Breton's call for massive EU investment in semiconductors, and the need to master the 5 nm node. 7/8 billion EUR of EU funding for R&D already secured, and he estimates at 20 billion EUR the next Important Project of Common European Interest lesechos.fr/tech-medias/high…
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One question I have is whether India would be interested in a US-UK offer of a similar kind. The Franco-Indian defense cooperation is something we know the UK badly wants to undermine and take over. Interesting times ahead.
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Recommendations for a European semiconductor industrial policy that delivers, after the #Chipsact, and the case for an EU-Japan-US cooperation framework on technology transfers: my two new reports
@i_montaigneEN institutmontaigne.org/en/pub…
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China's main weakness to build a world-class semiconductor industry is a lack of talent - a shortage of 200000 to 300000 people. Caixin advocates targeted measures and concludes that "only free academic environment can give rise to unfetted innovation" caixinglobal.com/2020-08-24/…
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This third point is actually interesting, even if he probably overestimates the actual gains for the European side. Overall, his piece is a great illustration of how the lack of communication creates misperceptions, and this is probably going to get worse.
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Statement by 32 directors of European think-tanks on the targeting of independent researchers and civil society institutions that "undermines practical and constructive engagement by people who are striving to contribute positively to policy debates" statement-china-sanctions.ve…
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High tech nationalization in China: of 165 listed companies that changed ownership in 2019, 44 were acquired by state-owned or government-run investment companies. Many were involved in highly strategic fields like surveillance and information systems. asia.nikkei.com/Business/Chi…
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La guerre russe pose aussi à la Chine la question de l’acceptabilité sociale de fortes pertes. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer la capacité propre de Taiwan à infliger de sérieuses pertes à l’APL, contre une flotte d’invasion, dans les airs, 6/14
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"There are doubts in the U.S. and elsewhere that this trip will deliver major results". But who said the aim of the state visit was to deliver "major results"? A thread on Macron's state visit to China. ⬇️⬇️
politico.eu/article/war-ukra…
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The first time the Taiwanese government sets up an investment fund as a foreign policy tool. Taiwan plays its economic card in cautiously in Lithuania, this is relatively small scale and narrowly targeted. politico.eu/article/lithuani…
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Or il est très difficile de prévoir la résilience de la société TW à une offensive. Créer de fortes tensions, faire croire que la Chine ne craint ni les incidents ni l’escalade, permet à l’APL de tirer des enseignements sur l’esprit de défense de TW et vise à le briser. 5/14
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Some PLA psychological warfare. This is the video posted on the Weibo account of Naval and Merchant Ships, showing an attack on Taiwan. Striking and striking, apparently without considering counterstrikes. piped.video/N19Frme486o via @YouTube
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Xi Jinping on the need to create the image of a "more lovable and more respectable China" through "a strategic media system more obviously Chinese". Reining in the wolf-warriors or simply more coverage of the attractive sides of Chinese society and nature?
#China #propaganda In May 31 #Politburo meeting, #XiJinping calls for strengthening China's external media outreach, build "international discourse clout commensurate with China's overall power and int'l standing 形成同我国综合国力和国际地位相匹配的国际话语权". Highlights 1/6
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Is this covered by the EU's anti-coercion instrument? A lot of people must be laughing in Beijing.
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Volume capacity stays in Taiwan, but even more importantly, TSMC’s Taiwan foundries will remain two generations ahead of TSMC Arizona. Remaining two generations ahead has been the goal of US’s semiconductor tech controls vis-à-vis China for decades.
2/2 Minister Wang Mei-hua also said TSMC's current capacity in Taiwan is 2 million wafers per month, compared to the 20,000/month planned for the USA fab, so TSMC's base will remain in Taiwan, the report says. $TSM $INTC #Samsung #semiconductors msn.com/zh-tw/money/topstori…
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President @vonderleyen's State of the Union Address is worth reading in full, but also for its China bits. "It does not make sense for Europe to build a perfect road between a Chinese-owned copper mine and a Chinese-owned harbour". ec.europa.eu/commission/pres…
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The clearest articulation so far by France of a policy of reducing dependance on China for supply chains. asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Pic…
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A jaw-dropping proposal by Prof. Ju Jiandong, director of the Center for International Finance and Economic Research at Tsinghua University, for what he calls a "counter-international tech containment" policy (“反国际技术遏制”政策) pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn/portal…
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