I'm trying to watch this video by Dr. Hossenfelder - who, as a person I very much like - but it is difficult. Rather than discuss the whole video, I want to discuss a difficulty that is basic to contemporary free will debate.
The issue is the general acceptance of the consequence argument as sound. This is an argument that concludes that determinism is incompatible with leeway free will, the ability to do otherwise. Source compatibilists (John Martin Fischer) are convinced of its soundness, so are libertarians (Carl Ginet), so are free will skeptics (Galen Strawson). This comprises a substantive number of philosophers, but it also opens the door for a kind of rhetorical abuse, as witnessed in the video.
Hossenfelder begins with a version of the consequence argument: The world is ("almost entirely") determined by the laws of nature and propositions about the prehuman past, both of which are beyond human control. We have no control over the laws and the past, they dictate all, so there is no free will (.33-1.00).
Notice that this formulation of the consequence argument has a stronger conclusion than the usual formulation. It argues that free will is incompatible with what should be called "near-enough determinism" - allowing for indeterminism on the quantum level since it does not appear to influence our level of control over the world (though Bob Kane and Mark Ballaguer would disagree).
The point I want to highlight is the logic of the consequence argument is easy to extend. Dr. Hossenfelder does it without notice, moving from a conclusion about incompatibilism to a conclusion about free will skepticism. No one blinks because - well, because few know what to say, having already accepted the logic of consequence argument. This merely extends that faulty logic.
Thus, when Hossenfelder uses the reasoning a second time to undermine a more robust view of freedom - "autonomous agency" (4:30-7:15) - you are similarly stuck without response.
We need to talk about the consequence argument, and why we might question some of the logic, since we just saw that the logic is independent of the truth of determinism. Reasons for incompatibilism can be turned into reasons for free will skepticism. Indeed, either the indeterminism is so irregular that actions are random (and not free) or they have a regularity that approaches determinism (as seems to be the case).
Here are some independent reasons for rejecting the consequence argument that come from issues the philosophy of science.
1/ It assumes laws of nature are necessary in some absolute sense, something that can be treated logically as an operator ranging over propositions. Why not think laws of nature are just conditionally necessary, and not absolutely necessary?
2/ There is a confusion between arguments and predictions and explanations. The thought is that human actions are explained by factors beyond their control but this makes faulty assumptions about explanations (that they are kinds of arguments) that have been disputed (see Wesley Salmon's criticisms of Carl Hempel's covering law model).
3/ The issue is not the necessity of the past. It matters not that I cannot now wear a different pair of shoes yesterday. What matters is what I could have done yesterday. For this reason, proponents of the consequence argument have to use propositions about the REMOTE past to ground the kind of necessity that robs free will. But what does the remoteness of the past have to do with either free will or determinism? Why is the assumption necessary if determinism undermines free will? Note the real conclusion is conditional: if determinism is true AND there is a remote past, then no one has free will (Campbell 2007).
4/ Adding it all together, the consequence argument makes antiquated assumptions about the necessity of the laws, faulty assumptions about the necessity of the past, and tries to get you to accept an inference rule that combines them both - even though one necessity is indexed to time and the other is not.
piped.video/watch?v=YdL3QDza…